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This is the response brief on appeal of Respondent Suez Water Idaho Inc. ("Suez"). This 
brief responds to the opening brief ("BCID Brief') filed by Appellant Black Canyon Irrigation 
District ("Black Canyon") in appeal No. 44636. Suez is filing a substantively identical brief in 
response to the opening brief(" US Brief') in related appeal No. 44635 brought by the United 
States of America ("United States") (which is a respondent in this appeal and an appellant in 
appeal No. 44635). The other respondent is the State ofldaho ("State"). In this brief, Suez 
refers to the United States and Black Canyon collectively as the Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") 
Court to disallow the United States' late claim Nos. 65-23531 and 65-23532 (the "Late Claims") 
for so-called "second fill" or "refill" storage rights in connection with two federal on-stream 
reservoirs, Deadwood and Cascade, operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") in 
the Payette River basin. 
The Late Claims assert water rights developed under the constitutional method that are in 
addition to the Bureau's decreed storage water rights for the Deadwood and Cascade Reservoirs 
(the "Storage Rights"). 1 The Storage Rights authorize the storage and beneficial use of water for 
irrigation, municipal, and power purposes. Storage and release for the federal government's 
flood control operations are not authorized purposes of use of these rights. 
According to the United States, the Late Claims were filed to secure water rights that 
operate under priority (i.e., with the ability to call out or injure other rights)2 to "complete one 
1 The Storage Rights are numbered 65-2927 A and 65-2927B for Cascade Reservoir (partial decrees issued 
March 31, 2003); and 65-2917 and 65-9483 for Deadwood Reservoir (partial decrees issued May 6, 2003, and 
March 31, 2003, respectively). R. at 543-57 (copies of the Storage Rights' partial decrees). 
2 The phrase "under priority," "in priority," and "under right of priority'' all mean the same thing in the 
context of this litigation. Saying that a diversion to storage occurs in or under priority simply means that that the 
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physical fill of [the Bureau's] reservoirs in years when it must release stored water for flood 
control." R. at 18. In other words, the Late Claims represent claimed entitlements to store water 
in addition to the annual volume authorized under the Storage Rights. 
The Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or "Department") recommended 
that the Late Claims be disallowed because they were "not claimed in [the] prior adjudication," 
R. at 44, (i.e., the "Payette Adjudication").3 The United States objected to IDWR's 
recommendation (Black Canyon later intervened). Ultimately, the SRBA Court disallowed the 
Late Claims on grounds that they are barred by the express terms of final judgment entered in the 
Payette Adjudication, by general principles of res judicata, and by operation of statute in effect 
during the Payette Adjudication. R. at 2511-18. 
The SRBA Court did not address whether, absent the Payette Adjudication's preclusive 
effect, the Late Claims could or should be decreed on their merits. Indeed, the Appellants never 
even attempted to prove up the Late Claims with evidence or argument supporting "refill" rights 
by showing diversion and beneficial use under the constitutional method of appropriation. 
Instead, they took the position that their own Late Claims were "unnecessary" because, they 
argued, the underlying Storage Rights include the right to fill and refill under-priority.4 
Essentially, the Appellants said, "Please instruct the Department to administer the S,torage Rights 
in a way that makes the Late Claims redundant and unnecessary." 
storage right holder has the right to divert at that time pursuant to right of priority, i.e., to the detriment of users with 
junior priorities. 
3 The Payette Adjudication is Gem County Case No. 3667, In the Matter of the General Determination of 
the Right to the Use of Surface and Groundwater of the Payette River Drainage. 
4 R. at 1882 (Black Canyon's footnote 3 stating that the Late Claims are "unnecessary"); R. at 2271 (United 
States' footnote 3 stating support for argument that Late Claims are "unnecessary"). See also R. at 2518 (SRBA 
Court recognizing Black Canyon's argument that the Late Claims are "unnecessary"). 
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Thus, the core of the United States' and Black Canyon's litigation is an attack on the 
Department's accounting methodology. The SRBA Court wisely recognized that the claimants' 
argument amounted to a collateral attack on the previously decreed Storage Rights and that the 
SRBA is not the proper forum to address accounting issues. R. at 2518-19. The Storage Rights 
were decreed over a decade ago and were certified as final judgments under Rule 54(b ). No 
appeal was taken, nor was any attempt made to reopen them in the SRBA under Idaho R. Civ. P. 
60(b). The SRBA Court explained, correctly, that if the claimants or users wish to raise issues of 
administration now, "then the water right holder must take up the matter first with the Director, 
not the Court who issued the decree." R. at 2519. 
As this Court noted in the Basin Wide 17 litigation, the Director of IDWR has discretion, 
subject to judicial review, to establish an accounting methodology and to distribute water 
accordingly. A & B Irrigation Dist. v. State ("BW 17"), 157 Idaho 385, 394, 336 P.3d 792, 801 
(2014). The Director subjected his accounting methodology to review in a contested case in 
Basin 63, which is now on appeal to this Court. Neither Appellant elected to participate in that 
contested case, its judicial review, or the pending appeals. 5 The Appellants seek to end-run that 
process by using these Basin 65 Late Claims proceedings not to establish new water rights, but to 
reopen and modify the Storage Rights to address questions of administration. Specifically, they 
seek to avoid the deference owed to the Director by shoehorning their objections to the 
accounting methodology into their Late Claims case. Having given clear direction in its BW 17 
decision and elsewhere, this Court should not tolerate this end run. 
5 The Basin 63 appeals are pending with this Court under Docket Nos. 44677-2016, 44745-2017, and 
44746-2017. The United States has storage rights directly at issue in the Basin 63 appeals. Black Canyon does not, 
but could have sought to participate in the proceedings below. In any event, either of them could have petitioned to 
initiate a similar proceeding specifically addressing their Basin 65 rights. 
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The simple answer to these appeals is to affirm the District Court's conclusion that the 
Appellants' arguments about accounting methods are procedurally and jurisdictionally barred. 
Suez addresses those jurisdictional issues, but will devote much of its brief to the merits of the 
accounting challenge and to proof issues on the Late Claims. In doing so, Suez does not wish to 
convey the impression that these issues are properly before the Court. Suez underscores its firm 
conviction that there is no reason for the Court to reach them. They are presented only out of an 
abundance of caution. 
An affirmance of the District Court will have relatively limited impact beyond this case. 
In contrast, a reversal could have far-reaching consequences. A decision in favor of the 
Appellants would seriously undermine the finality of decrees entered in general stream 
adjudications. Moreover, a decision allowing storage water right holders to refill in priority 
would fundamentally up-end Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. In this case alone, it would 
allow the federal government to store and release water for essentially any purpose ad infinitum 
to the injury of juniors and future appropriators. This would transfer control of Idaho's water to 
the federal reservoir operators. Rather than fulfilling its statutory duty to distribute water rights 
in accordance with Idaho law, the Department would be relegated to observer status. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues identified by the other parties, Suez presents the following issues 
that may become relevant if this Court determines not to affirm the District Court's decision that 
the Late Claims are precluded: 
1. To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the release of water 
accrued to the original storage rights was necessary and not wasteful? [Yes.] 
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2. To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the quantity of water 
claimed was actually stored and beneficially used in quantities exceeding the amounts stored 
under the original storage rights? [Yes.] 
3. To prove up the Late Claims, must the claimant show that the diversion and use of 
water was not merely an historical practice or undertaken pursuant to their ancillary right to store 
"excess water" under the Storage Rights? [Yes.] 
4. If the Late Claims could be proven up in any quantity, would they be fully 
subordinated to future appropriations? [Yes.] 
5. If the Late Claims could be proven up in any quantity, have they been fully or 
partially forfeited or abandoned? [Yes.] 
6. Under Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine and the Maximum Use Doctrine, are 
holders of on-stream storage rights entitled, even in the absence of a remark or other express 
authorization on the face of the water right, to store and put to beneficial use "excess water" after 
the water right has been satisfied once when sufficient water is available to also satisfy all other 
water rights then in priority? [Yes.] 
7. Should this authority to take "excess water" without harming others be viewed as 
part of, ancillary to, or pursuant to the Storage Rights? [Yes.] 
8. Is the practice of crediting all physically and legally available water to the Storage 
Rights consistent with and compelled by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine and the Maximum 
Use Doctrine? [Yes.] 
9. Should Suez be awarded attorney fees on appeal? [Yes.] 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PAYETTE ADJUDICATION BARS THE LATE CLAIMS. 
The SRBA Court correctly held that the Late Claims are barred by the express terms of 
final judgment entered in the Payette Adjudication, by general principles of res judicata, and by 
operation of statute in effect during the Payette Adjudication. R. at 2511-18. The Appellants 
argue this was error. It is not. 
The Department issued "Proposed Findings of Water Rights in the Payette River 
Drainage Basin" ("Proposed Findings") that expressly held that anyone who failed to claim 
water rights within the basin "has forfeited such rights." R. 2512 (SRBA Court); R. at 524 
(Proposed Findings). The Appellants say this Court should ignore that provision because the 
Proposed Findings are not binding. This overlooks that fact that the Partial Decree Pursuant To 
Rule 54(b) lR.C.P. ("Payette Decree") issued by the Payette Adjudication Court on January 26, 
1986 referenced and (at least) implicitly adopted and incorporated the Proposed Findings. R. at 
450-454.6 
The Payette Decree addressed two categories of water rights: claims not being decreed, 
and claims being decreed. The category of claims not being decreed included those portions of 
the Proposed Finding "still involved in unresolved objections," plus some other specific rights 
not relevant here. 7 R. at 451-52. The category of claims being decreed included those listed in 
the Proposed Findings, as altered by certain orders and stipulations, and excluding the specific 
claims described in the first category. R. at 452. 
6 The Payette Decree described the Proposed Findings as containing "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Statutory and Decreed Rights not Claimed, Claims Submitted: Recommended to be Disallowed; Surface 
Water Rights, and Groundwater Rights." R. at 450. 
7 The claims not being decreed included: (1) the specific claims being listed in its Exhibit A, (2) the federal 
reserved water right claims by the U.S. Forest Service (listed in its Exhibit B), and (3) those water rights which were 
part of the court decision in Branson v. Miracle, 107 Idaho 221 (1984). 
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These two categories described the universe of decreed and potential water rights in the 
Payette River Drainage Basin. R. at 452 ("the water rights of the Payette River Drainage Basin 
... are as described" in the Proposed Finding, as amended by certain orders and stipulations, and 
excluding the specific claims described in the first category). The Storage Rights fell within the 
category of claims being decreed. The Late Claims, of course, do not fall within either category. 
Thus, the Payette Decree did not leave the door open for any other (i.e., late) claims. Nowhere 
does it suggest that additional claims could be filed. 
The Payette Decree was certified as final under Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P. R. at 453. As 
plainly stated in the Notice of Entry of Partial Decree dated January 21, 1986, this required that 
"any appeal of this partial decree must be filed with the district court within 42 days of January 
21, 1986. That is, on or before Tuesday, March 4, 1986, anyone objecting to the partial decree, 
must physically file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Gem County District Court." R. at 
487. No appeal was taken. 
The United States was a party to the Payette Adjudication, but it did not claim rights like 
those asserted in the Late Claims. It filed storage water right claims for Cascade and Deadwood 
Reservoirs based on prior state-issued licenses, which were included in the Payette Decree and 
now are reflected in the Storage Rights decreed by the SRBA Court. The rights asserted under 
the Late Claims were not in the specific list of claims excluded from the Payette Decree. The 
Payette Decree, by incorporating the Proposed Findings, expressly decreed "all rights 
established before October 19, 1977," R. at 524, and further declared that "[a]ny water user who 
heretofore diverted surface water or ground water ... and who, upon being joined to this action, 
failed to claim such water rights has forfeited such rights" under the forfeiture statute in effect at 
the time. R. at 524. Thus, the Late Claims are barred. 
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The timing of the Payette Decree and the commencement of the SRBA further support 
the conclusion that the SRBA is not merely an extension of the "unfinished" Payette 
Adjudication. Nor were these two pending actions consolidated under Rule 42, I.R.C.P. The 
Director of IDWR filed his petition to commence the SRBA on June 17, 1986-roughly five 
months after the Payette Decree was issued, and more than three months after the appeal 
deadline expired. In other words, the SRBA and the Payette Adjudication could not have been 
consolidated because they were never pending at the same time. Nothing in the Payette Decree 
suggests that Judge Doolittle intended the SRBA to be a continuation of the Payette 
Adjudication. 
In addition to holding that the Payette Decree 's express language bars the Late Claims, 
the SRBA Court also correctly held that the Late Claims are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 8 A water rights decree is "conclusive proof of diversion of the water, and of 
application of the water to beneficial use, i.e., the decree is res judicata as to the water rights at 
issue [in a subsequent proceeding]." Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461,465, 690 P.2d 916,920 
(1984), quoted in Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269,277,346 P.3d 
286,294 (2015). There is no exception to resjudicata that would relieve the Late Claims from 
its operation. 
The facts here are simple. The Late Claims reflect claims for 1965 priority date storage 
water rights under the constitutional method of appropriation. This requires evidence of actual 
8 "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same 
claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190, 207 
P.3d 162, 166 -167 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[l]n an action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and 
received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the 
first suit." Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437,849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993). This Court has 
stated that "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. at 437, 849 P.2d at 110. 
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diversion and beneficial use of water prior to 1971 (when the Idaho Legislature cut off beneficial 
use claims for surface water.) 
If the Late Claims have any merit now (an issue that is not before the Court in this 
appeal, and which as described below Suez strongly questions), that same merit must have 
existed during the Payette Adjudication since it conclusively adjudicated all rights prior to 1977. 
The claimed 1965 priority date means the Late Claims, if they ever were valid, must have been 
appropriated-i.e., come into existence-more than five years prior to the Payette Adjudication's 
commencement. 
So if the Late Claims can be proven up now, they could have been proven up in the 
Payette Adjudication. The relevant evidence and legal principles were exactly the same then as 
they are now. Then, as now, the law requires evidence of actual diversion and actual beneficial 
use of water prior to 1971 to prove up a water right under the constitutional method. This legal 
standard has existed since 1971, when the Idaho legislature outlawed the constitutional method 
of appropriation. Obviously, it existed when the Payette Decree was issued in 1986. Even more 
obvious, all pre-1971 evidence that the Appellants might assert to support the Late Claims today 
must have existed during the Payette Adjudication. 
The sole reason the Appellants contend the Late Claims could not have been claimed in 
the Payette Adjudication is because the Department adopted its Basin 65 computerized 
accounting system in 1992. But post-1971 evidence cannot change pre-1971 evidence. Even 
Black Canyon agreed with this simple notion in the proceedings below. R. at 1880-81 (Black 
Canyon arguing that post-1971 evidence in the record is not relevant). If the holder of a decreed 
water right has a "light bulb moment" when the Department does something administratively 
years after the decree, that is not a basis to re-open the decree. Indeed, the whole purpose of res 
judicata is to make litigants do their thinking before the decree is issued. 
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In any event, the Department's accounting methodologies ( or lack thereof) at any given 
time do not define water rights or dictate Idaho's law of prior appropriation. The alleged lack of 
IDWR administration up to 1965 is not relevant to the definition of the Late Claims, and the 
Department's implementation of its computerized accounting system in 1992 did not define or 
retroactively change whatever rights were already appropriated. Again, even Black Canyon 
seemed to agree with this in the proceedings below. R. at 1890 (Black Canyon arguing that 
"[ a ]dministrative accounting methods, no matter how obtuse, do not define the property rights at 
issue."). 
As discussed below (and which Suez's briefing in the Basin 63 appeals will address at 
length), the principles of one-fill, storable inflow, paper fill, and "excess water" refill are part 
and parcel of Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. These fundamental legal principles existed 
before the Department incorporated them into its computerized accounting programs, despite the 
fact that they may previously have been ignored. In other words, these principles have been 
confirmed and implemented, but were not created, by the Department's accounting systems. 
Thus, even if an accounting protocol can define a water right (which it cannot), and even 
if post-1971 circumstances could change pre-1971 evidence of diversion and beneficial use 
(which it cannot), the fact that in 1992 the Department implemented accounting principles that 
adhere to Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine does not mean the Late Claims could not have 
been asserted in the Payette Adjudication. If, as has been alleged, the federal reservoirs have 
"for decades" operated for flood control without flood control water rights, the Bureau could 
have and should have wondered how those operations affected its storage rights which authorize 
storage of water for beneficial uses but not flood control. The Bureau could have and should 
have claimed in the Payette Adjudication whatever additional rights might be necessary to refill 
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its reservoirs for beneficial uses after releasing or bypassing water for flood control. But it made 
no such claims. Now they are barred. 
II. IF THE LATE CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAYETTE ADJUDICATION, IT 
WILL BE NO EASY TASK TO PROVE THEM UP. 
If this Court determines that the Late Claims are not precluded by the Payette 
Adjudication, the next question would be: can the Late Claims be proven up on their alleged 
merits? The record shows that neither the United States nor Black Canyon attempted to make 
this showing in the proceedings below. Indeed, they take the same approach on appeal, arguing 
that the Late Claims are unnecessary because, they contend, the Storage Rights already include 
priority refill entitlements. US Brief at 40-41; BCID Brief at 24-30. As explained in Sections III 
and IV below, this is not the appropriate proceeding to make that determination and, in any case, 
the Storage Rights do not include such entitlements. In this proceeding, where the issue involves 
whether the Late Claims can (and have been) be proven, the Appellants have utterly failed to 
take the opportunity to make that showing with evidence of actual diversion and beneficial use, 
and they should not get another chance. 
The Late Claims reflect water rights claimed under the constitutional method of 
appropriation that are in addition to the Storage Rights. That was what the Appellants were 
supposed to show in the proceedings below. R. at 174 (SRBA Court order stating "the burden 
now rests with the claimants to come forward with evidence to ... establish the existence of the 
rights under the constitutional method of appropriation. To do so, the claimants must establish 
the two essentials for obtaining a water right under the constitutional method-diversion and 
application of the water to a beneficial use."). The Appellants did not attempt to make that 
showing, and Suez believes they cannot. 
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In the proceedings below, the State of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment advanced 
the argument that there is no factual basis supporting the Late Claims. R. at 1572 ("The Bureau 
is incapable of carrying its burden of proving actual beneficial use of the additional storage water 
claimed under the Late Claims.") Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Appellants were 
then obligated to put on evidence showing that material facts were in dispute concerning the 
merits of the Late Claims. They elected not to do so, instead simply relying on bald assertions 
that the Late Claims can be recognized because the United States has "for decades" physically 
refilled reservoirs following flood control releases and the Storage Rights demonstrate that "the 
quantity of water provided by one physical fill of the reservoirs has been applied to beneficial 
use." R. at 1904 (the United States' brief in response to summary judgment). See also R. at 
1892-94 (similar assertions in Black Canyon's summary judgment brief). 
The Appellants apparently believe that proving up a beneficial use claim for multiple fills 
of a reservoir that already has an existing storage right is a trivial task. They say, in essence: 
"Everybody knows that the reservoirs have refilled after flood releases. And everybody knows 
that the water in the reservoir is used to irrigate the lands described under the decreed storage 
rights. Based on those two facts, we are entitled to 'supplemental' beneficial use rights to store 
and release and store again, in priority, all of the storable water that comes down the river. "9 
That is their position in a nutshell. However, it is wrong. If the Late Claims proceed, the 
Appellants face substantial hurdles to prove them up. 
9 The Appellants like to describe the Late Claims as "supplemental" water right claims, as though that 
moniker might make these unique, never-before-seen claims easier to digest. This Court has described a 
supplemental water right as "an additional appropriation of water to make up a deficiency in supply from an existing 
water right." Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414,416, 18 P.3d 219,221 (2001) (Walters, J.). 
If the Late Claims are intended to be supplemental water rights, they must be denied because they fail the definition 
set forth in Barron-there is no deficiency in supply in the flood control years when the Late Claims are asserted to 
be needed. Moreover, supplemental water rights typically are diverted from a different source when the "primary" 
water rights' source is no longer available (such as in the case of"primary" surface water rights and "supplemental" 
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First, in order to prove up a claim under the constitutional method of appropriation, the 
claimant must show that the claimed water was not diverted and put to beneficial use under some 
other right. Indeed, it appears that the Appellants have confessed this very point. By contending 
that the Late Claims are unnecessary (because, they contend, the Storage Rights allow refill in 
priority after paper fill), they have acknowledged the basic principle that one cannot obtain a 
second right for diversions authorized under an existing right. 
Indeed, this is an elementary point of Idaho's water law, which does not allow hoarding 
or wasting of water, or the appropriation of more water than is needed to accomplish beneficial 
use. Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR ("AFRD#2"), 143 Idaho 862, 880, 154 P.3d 433, 
451 (2007) (Trout, J.) ("Neither the Idaho Constitution, nor statutes, permit irrigation districts 
and individual water right holders to waste water or unnecessarily hoard it without putting it to 
some beneficial use.") "The extent of beneficial use [is] an inherent and necessary limitation 
upon the right to appropriate." Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. IDWR ("Rangen II"), 160 Idaho 
119, 369 P.3d 897, 911 (2016) (quoting Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 
117, 32 S. Ct. 470, 471 (1912)). 
In short, water lawfully diverted under the decreed Storage Rights may not form the basis 
for the Late Claims. As explained in Section IV.B below, Suez contends that the Storage Rights 
include the ancillary right to store "excess water" without injury to other rights once the Storage 
Rights have been satisfied once under priority. Thus, to prove up the Late Claims, the United 
States must show that the claimed storage did not occur under the Storage Rights in priority or 
ground water rights). That is not the case here. The Late Claims seek water from the very same source as the 
Storage Rights, and not because that source is no longer available but because that source has too much water. 
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under their ancillary entitlements to store excess water." 10 The Appellants have made no such 
showing, and it is unclear how they could. 
Perhaps it is theoretically possible to establish a claim such as those described in the Late 
Claims, but doing so would not be easy. Unless the United States can show that the storage 
claimed under the Late Claims occurred other than under Storage Rights' priority or the ancillary 
right to divert excess water, what proof is there that some new right (i.e., the right asserted under 
the Late Claims) was ever appropriated? There would have been no notice of such appropriation 
to other water right holders. Notice is fundamental. Nielson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 
488,490 (1911) ("the actual diversion of the water and its application to a beneficial use ... 
constitutes actual notice to every intending appropriator of the water of such a stream. "). 11 
Moreover, the Appellants must show that the "second fill" water was beneficially used. 
In other words, did storing that water make any difference? Suppose the federal government fills 
the reservoirs' 863,000 acre-feet capacity, releases 100,000 acre-feet for flood control, and then 
tops off the reservoirs with 100,000 acre-feet ofrefill. If the space holders only use 600,000 
acre-feet of stored water, the refill did nothing ( despite potential injury to other water users). If it 
is carried over, it may simply be spilled in the next year's flood control release. In other words, 
the fact that reservoirs refill does not equate to beneficial use. 
10 If it were possible to prove up the Late Claims on the basis of storage of water under the United States' 
ancillary rights to refill with excess water, any such decrees should include provisions subordinating the rights to all 
existing and future appropriations so as to give effect to the nature of the right (i.e., an appropriation that never was, 
and never will be, exercised to the detriment of other valid water rights). 
11 The Nielson Court also stated: "Water diverted from a stream naturally diminishes the volume. One 
seeking to acquire the right to the use of water must take notice of the amount available and visible, and it must be 
conclusively presumed that he inquires into the extent of the supply from which the water is to be drawn, and how 
that supply has been diminished by others whose rights are prior in time." Nielson, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. at 489 
(quoting with approval Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423,427 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd, 159 F. 651 (9th Cir. 1908), aff'd, 
221 U.S. 485, 31 S. Ct. 703, 55 L. Ed. 821 (1911)). 
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Obviously, water ostensibly stored under the Late Claims that was released for flood 
control (in the same or a subsequent year) does not prove beneficial use under the Late Claims. 
Moreover, simply carrying over water does not prove beneficial use. While an established 
storage right may lawfully carry over reasonable amounts of unused storage, carryover storage in 
itself does not demonstrate the beneficial use necessary to prove up a right. Consequently, to the 
extent water could be shown to be legitimately stored under the Late Claims, it would not be 
sufficient for the United States to rely on carryover as evidence that such water was beneficially 
used. It must instead prove actual beneficial use of the water stored. 
Finally ( or perhaps initially), the Appellants must show that the additional storage under 
the Late Claims was reasonable and necessary. That is, it must be shown that the United States 
needed to release or bypass storable inflow available for storage under the Storage Rights since 
that is the reason why the United States claims it needs to store additional water under the Late 
Claims in the first place. 12 Allowing the United States to obtain additional rights to store 
additional water in priority to replace water that never should have been released would reward 
(and encourage) sloppy reservoir operations and waste. The United States should not be able to 
obtain additional priority rights to refill an unnecessary shortfall of its own creation. 
The problems with proving up the Late Claims might not be as difficult if the Late 
Claims asked for second rights from a different source, or to store water in a different reservoir, 
or to beneficially use water on different lands. In any of those circumstances, there would be a 
clearer distinction between the Storage Rights and the Late Claims, and the evidence to prove 
12 Concerning the standard for whether the United States needed to release water for flood control in order 
to justify the Late Claims, it would seem the United States should at least have to show reasonable necessity, and 
possibly strict necessity. This Court has consistently reaffirmed the State's policy against wasting water. See, e.g., 
AFRD#2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 451 ("Neither the Idaho Constitution, nor statutes, permit irrigation districts 
and individual water right holders to waste water or unnecessarily hoard it without putting it to some beneficial 
use."). 
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them up likely would be more straightforward. But that is not the case here, where the Late 
Claims seek to store water from the same source, in the same reservoirs, in the same total 
amounts, for the same beneficial use as the Storage Rights. 
The discussion above is not intended to flesh out all of the mechanics for proving up 
claims such as the Late Claims. It is not Suez's burden to prove them up, it is the Appellants' 
burden. There may be (likely would be) more issues to address if the merits of the Late Claims 
had actually been litigated. But the Appellants did not put on any evidence to try to prove them 
up, and they should not be given another chance. 
Even if it could be shown that the refill was reasonable and the Late Claim water was put 
to put to beneficial use, the Appellants are still not out of the woods. Whatever Late Claims 
might be proven up based on pre-1971 events have been lost. With respect to the Late Claims, 
perhaps the only relevant fact about the Department's current accounting system is that no 
"refill" water has been stored under any priority since the Department implemented the 
accounting system in 1992. If any rights to priority "refill" ever existed ( and there is no evidence 
they have), they were either abandoned in 1992 or have been forfeited subsequently. 13 
Clearly, recognizing such priority refill rights now-rights that have never been on the 
books-would diminish the priorities of junior water rights developed since 1992. Because 
those junior rights are entitled to have the system maintained as it existed when their rights were 
appropriated, any right to refill in priority (whether in the Storage Rights or in the Late Claims) 
would have to be subordinated to existing juniors. 
13 If the Appellants believe they are insufficiently protected by the existing rights to store extra water 
during free river conditions, they could file a new permit application for an additional right. Doing so would protect 
juniors who have acquired rights under the existing regime (i.e., in a system where priority refill rights have never 
been on the books), would put everyone on notice, and allow the Department to determine whether and under what 
conditions to issue a permit and later a license. 
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Before closing on this subject, it bears emphasis that there is no need for this Court to 
address how one proves up a late claim for storage refill. That is a complicated subject, and 
there are ample reasons not to go there-notably res judicata and the failure of the Appellants to 
present anything approaching meaningful proof. Rather, this discussion is included to address 
the obvious question of what should happen if this Court does not agree with the SRBA Court 
that the Late Claims are barred by the Payette Adjudication. In short, the Late Claims would 
have to be remanded to the SRBA Court so the Appellants could attempt to clear the many 
evidentiary hurdles on their path to proving up these unique claims. 
Ill. THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
STORAGE RIGHTS INCLUDE PRIORITY REFILL ENTITLEMENTS (AS EXPLAINED 
BELOW THEY DO NOT). 
Instead of offering evidence to prove up the Late Claims, the Appellants contend that the 
Late Claims are "unnecessary" because, in their view, the Storage Rights should be interpreted as 
including priority refill entitlements. USA Brief at 40; BCID Brief at 24-30. Section IV of this 
brief addresses why that contention is wrong. This Section III addresses why these proceedings 
on the Late Claims are not the proper avenue for re-defining or re-interpreting the nature or 
extent of the Storage Rights or addressing how they should be administered. 
This Court should affirm the SRBA Court's holding that this is not the proper proceeding 
to address the scope or administration of the Storage Rights. Simply put, the Late Claims are not 
about the nature or extent of the Storage Rights. That ship sailed more than a decade ago when 
the SRBA Court issued the Storage Rights' partial decrees. If one needs to understand what the 
Storage Rights mean in order to determine the validity, nature or extent of the Late Claims, one 
need look no further than the face of their decrees, which contain no priority refill entitlements. 
The United States' and Black Canyon's attempts to re-examine the nature and extent of the 
Storage Rights calls into question the finality and conclusiveness of all SRBA partial decrees. 
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This appeal also is not about the administration of the Storage Rights' decrees-that is 
the Director ofIDWR's duty (which is subject to judicial oversight but not in these Late Claims 
proceedings). The pending Basin 63 appeals are the appropriate proceedings to review whether 
the Director is correctly interpreting and administering federal on-stream storage rights' decrees 
according to Idaho law. 
A. The Storage Rights' decrees issued more than a decade ago 
unambiguously define their nature and extent. 
"Idaho courts interpret water decrees using the same interpretation rules that apply to 
contracts." Rangen, Inc. v. IDWR ("Rangen F'), 159 Idaho 798,367 P.3d 193,202 (2016) (J. 
Jones, C.J.). The "proper analysis is to look first only to the four comers of the divorce 
decree ..... The court's inquiry will move beyond the four comers of the decree ... only when 
the decree is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations." Barley v. 
Smith, 149 Idaho 171,177,233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010) (J. Jones, J.). 
There is no ambiguity in the Storage Rights' decrees, so there is no reason to look beyond 
their four comers to determine what they mean. Each of the decrees clearly states the maximum 
annual volume of water allowed to be diverted into storage under the right' s priority date. And 
that is all they say. They do not authorize flood control as a beneficial use or otherwise. There is 
no provision for refill and no special rule or remark saying that water released or bypassed for 
flood control does not count toward the authorized quantity. Accordingly, there is no reason to 
read these provisions into the rights. 
Thus, to the extent it is necessary to understand the nature and extent of the Storage 
Rights to decide the Late Claims, the Court need look no further than the face of the decrees. 14 
14 As discussed in Section IV below, even if the Storage Rights' decrees were ambiguous (which they are 
not), neither Idaho Jaw nor the evidence in this case provide a basis for finding a priority refill entitlement associated 
with the Storage Rights. 
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B. The Storage Rights' decrees are final and should not be subject to 
collateral attack in these Late Claims proceedings. 
The Storage Rights were partially decreed almost a decade ago. R. at 543-57. They were 
incorporated by reference into the SRBA Court's Final Unified Decree, 15 which is "binding 
against all persons," R. at 841, and "conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights 
within the Snake River Basin within the State of Idaho with a priority date prior to November 19, 
1987 .... " R. at 839. "By statute, 'decree[s] entered in a general adjudication shall be 
conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system.'" 
Rangen I, 159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 200 (quoting LC.§ 42-1420(1)). The decrees were not 
appealed or set aside, and the SRBA Court did not retain jurisdiction over them in its Pending 
Subcases Order. See footnote 15 above. Simply put, the Storage Rights have been fully 
adjudicated. They were not re-opened and their nature and extent are not at issue in these 
subcases. 
"Generally, final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack." 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,894,277 P.3d 337,341 (2012) (emphasis in original; internal 
quotation marks omitted).16 This Court has held that a water rights decree is "conclusive proof 
of diversion of the water, and of application of the water to beneficial use, i.e., the decree is res 
judicata as to the water rights at issue [in a subsequent proceeding]." Crow v. Carlson, 107 
15 The SRBA Court issued its Final Unified Decree in 2014, and the Storage Rights were not included in 
the list of claims over which the court retained jurisdiction R. at 840 (Final Unified Decree); R. at 859-60 ( Order 
Regarding Subcases Pending Upon Entry of Final Unified Decree, the "Pending Subcases Order'). Claim numbers 
listed in the Pending Subcases Order were excepted from the Final Unified Decree so they could continue to be 
processed. The Late Claims were included in the Pending Subcases Order, but the Storage Rights' partial decrees 
were not. 
16 The SRBA Court has consistently held that "a party cannot have its water use adjudicated or 
administratively determined in one proceeding and then re-adjudicate the right under a more favorable legal theory 
in a subsequent proceeding." BCID Brief App. 2 at 16 (Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment re: Bureau of Reclamation Streamflow Maintenance Claim ("Lucky Peak Order") at 16, 
Subcase No. 63-03618 (Sept. 28, 2008)). 
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Idaho 461,465,690 P.2d 916,920 (1984), quoted in Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit 
Co., 158 Idaho 269,277,346 P.3d 286,294 (2015). The Crow Court's "holding of the 
presumption of accuracy of the decree is in keeping with the judicial policy of deterring the 
reopening of judgments long after cases are decided and the files are closed." Id. 
The time to determine the nature and extent of the Storage Rights-including whether 
they include any priority refill entitlements-was before their partial decrees were issued. The 
Storage Rights' partial decrees contain all of their elements and any remarks and other matters 
necessary for definition of the rights, for clarification of any element of the rights, or for 
administration of the rights by the Director. Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) ("The district court shall 
enter a partial decree determining the nature and extent of the water right .... "); Idaho Code§ 
42-1411(2) (describing elements, remarks, and other matters to be included in partial decrees). If 
the United States or Black Canyon believed the Storage Rights included a right to refill under 
priority after stored or storable water is vacated or released for flood control, they could have and 
should have attempted to have such elements or remarks included in the decrees. See Rangen I, 
159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 201 ("If Rangen wanted its water rights to be interpreted 
differently, it should have timely asserted that in the SRBA."). But they made no such attempt, 
and the decrees contain no such elements or remarks. No timely or appropriate procedural 
mechanism has been used to request re-interpretation of the Storage Rights here. 
Now the Appellants want to undo their earlier oversight (intentional or not) by 
challenging the decreed Storage Rights' nature and scope in these Late Claims proceedings. 
This strategy constitutes an improper attempt to re-adjudicate the Storage Rights under a new 
legal theory the Appellants find more favorable. But the Court should not indulge them. As the 
SRBA Court has stated, "[t]he late claim procedure was not intended to give claimants a second 
bite at the apple." R. at 356. 
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There is no merit to the Appellants contention that the property rights defined by the 
Storage Rights' partial decrees are subject to interpretation in these Late Claim proceedings. 
See, e.g., BCID Brief at 21 ("interpretation of the [Storage Rights] partial decrees against the 
legal backdrop of federal flood control operations is not a collateral attack on the existing partial 
decrees." (emphasis in original)). Disputing the "interpretation" of partial decrees rather than the 
partial decrees themselves is a "distinction without a difference." Rang en I, 159 Idaho at_, 
367 P.3d at 201. Any "interpretation" of the Storage Rights' partial decrees cannot be 
inconsistent with their plain language. Id. ("Any interpretation of ... partial decrees that is 
inconsistent with their plain language would necessarily impact the certainty and finality of 
SRBA judgments .... "). 17 
In sum, the Storage Rights contain no mention of any priority refill entitlements now 
sought by the Appellants, and that "cannot be disputed due to the SRBA partial decrees." 
Mullinix, 158 Idaho at 278, 346 P.3d at 295. Accordingly, the Appellants are precluded from re-
litigating that issue. 
C. The Director of IDWR has the duty and discretion to administer the 
Storage Rights according to their decrees and Idaho law. 
This Court has held that the Director of IDWR has the duty and discretion to determine 
how water should be counted toward the "fill" or "satisfaction" of the Storage Rights and in 
accordance with their decrees and Idaho law. Whether the Director's methodology is a lawful 
exercise of his discretion is at issue in the Basin 63 appeals. That is the proper proceeding for 
answering the "refill" question, not this one. 
17 The Ran gen I Court pointed out that any interpretation of partial decrees inconsistent with their plain 
language "needed to be made in the SRBA itself." Rangen I, 159 Idaho at_, 367 P.3d at 201. This, of course, 
implies the appropriate procedural mechanism is used, or else such an inconsistent interpretation would run afoul of 
the other judicial doctrines already discussed, such as res judicata and interpreting unambiguous court decrees by 
looking within their four comers. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUEZ-BLACK CANYON APPEAL-NO. 44636-2016 (JUNE 9, 2017) 
13719751_1 / 30-151 
Page 26 of 49 
Citing the Director's authority over this question, the SRBA Court in the Basin Wide 
Issue 17 proceeding declined to address "the issue of when the quantity element of a storage 
water right is rightfully considered to be 'filled' or 'satisfied."' R. at 887. The SRBA Court 
explained: 
[ A ]ddressing the issue of fill may require factual inquiries, 
investigation and record development specific to a given reservoir 
and the water right or rights associated with the reservoir. 
Addressing the issue of fill will require a record as to how the 
Department accounts for fill in each individual reservoir under its 
accounting methodology .... 
Furthermore, the authority and responsibility for measuring 
and distributing water to and among appropriators is statutorily 
conferred to, and vested in, the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources and its Director .... 
The Director has the authority and discretion to determine 
how water from a natural water source is distributed to storage 
water rights pursuant to accounting methodologies he employs. 
The Director's discretion in this respect is not unbridled, but rather 
is subject to state law and oversight by the courts. When review of 
the Director's discretion in this respect is brought before the courts 
in an appropriate proceeding, and upon a properly developed 
record, the courts can determine whether the Director has properly 
exercised his discretion regarding accounting methodologies. 
R. at 887-88. See also R. at 885 (SRBA Court's footnote 6 stating that "the Department utilizes 
an accounting methodology for the purpose of determining when a storage water right has been 
'filled.' ... [T]he Department's accounting methodology is an administrative function which 
should be addressed on a case-by-case basis on a fully developed factual record and where the 
Department is a party to the proceeding."). 18 
18 The SRBA Court reached similar conclusions in its order designating Basin-Wide Issue No. 17: 
An on-stream reservoir alters the stream affecting the administration of all rights on the 
source. Accordingly, some methodology is required to implement priority administration of 
affected rights. Addressing the issue of reservoir fill may require factual inquiries, investigation 
and record development specific to a given reservoir, including how the State accounts for fill in 
each individual reservoir under its accounting program. As stated above, such factually specific 
inquiries do not lend themselves to review in a basin-wide setting involving multiple reservoirs. 
Furthermore, unlike the issue of priority refill which is directly related to the quantity element of a 
water right, the issue of fill is purely an issue of administration. 
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This Court agreed and also declined to decide how water should be counted toward the 
fill of a water right. "Nor will this Court answer that question on appeal." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 
392,336 P.3d at 799. This Court also agreed that the question must be answered by the Director: 
"That statute gives the Director a clear legal duty to distribute water. However, the details of the 
performance of the duty are left to the director's discretion." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 393,336 P.3d 
at 800 ( quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Once partial decrees are issued, Idaho law provides that the Director of ID WR-not the 
SRBA Court or any court-has the sole duty and authority to distribute water accordingly. Idaho 
Code§ 42-602 "require[s] the Director to interpret ... partial decrees." Rangen I, 159 Idaho at 
_, 367 P.3d at 204. 
The decrees give the Director a quantity he must provide to each 
water user in priority. In other words, the decree is a property right 
to a certain amount of water: a number that the Director must fill 
in priority to that user. However, it is within the Director's 
discretion to determine when that number has been met for each 
individual decree. 
BW 17, 157 Idaho at 394,336 P.3d at 801. 
The Director initiated the administrative proceeding at issue in the Basin 63 appeals "[t]o 
address and resolve concerns with and/or objections to how water is counted or credited toward 
the fill of water rights for the federal on-stream reservoirs pursuant to existing procedures of 
accounting in Water District 63." R. at 1507. See also Addendum to US Brief, Tab 2, p. 2. 19 As 
predicted by the SRBA Court in the quote above, R. at 887-88, that administrative proceeding 
produced a record as to how the Department accounts for fill in the Boise River reservoirs under 
BW I 7, 157 Idaho at 388-89, 336 P.3d at 795-96 (quoting SRBA Court; emphasis added). 
19 Tab 2 of the Addendum to US Brief is a copy of the SRBA Court's Memorandum Decision and Order in 
Ballentyne Ditch Co. et al. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, Case No. CV-WA-2015-21376 (Idaho 4th Dist.) 
(Sept. 1, 2016), the decision at issue in the Basin 63 appeals. 
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its accounting methodology, including factual inquiries, investigation and record development 
specific to the Boise River reservoirs and the decreed water rights associated with them. The 
Director's decision in that proceeding, based on its fully developed record, is before this Court in 
the Basin 63 appeals. As the United States points out, because the Department's Basin 63 and 
Basin 65 accounting systems use similar principles for accruing water to federal on-stream 
reservoirs, the outcome of the Basin 63 appeals may affect Basin 65 water rights accounting. 
Thus, the Basin 63 appeals are the proceeding where this Court has said the issue of determining 
on-stream reservoir fill should be determined. Not here. 
IV. THE STORAGE RIGHTS DO NOT INCLUDE PRIORITY REFILL ENTITLEMENTS, BUT 
IDAHO'S PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE NEVERTHELESS AUTHORIZES 
SECOND FILL WITH "EXCESS WATER" SO LONG AS OTHER RIGHTS ARE NOT 
HARMED. 
Appellants argue that the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements, and ask this 
Court to make that determination. US Brief at 43 ("this Court should ... , in the alternative, 
affirm the district court on the grounds that the decreed rights for Cascade and Deadwood 
Reservoirs enable the United States to fill the reservoirs up to the decreed amounts after releases 
for flood-control purposes")2°; BCID Brief at 40 ("BCID respectfully requests that this Court 
review and adopt the Special Master's reasoning and conclusions of law addressing the flood 
control effect question as its own.").21 As explained above in Section III, this is not the right 
proceeding to make that determination. 
20 The United States' statement fails to mention whether the relief sought includes rights to refill under 
priority after flood control releases. Presumably it does. If not, there is no dispute because Suez believes the United 
States' Storage Rights include entitlements to fill the reservoirs with excess water up to the decreed amounts 
following flood control releases so long as no other water rights are harmed (i.e., not under a right of priority). 
21 Black Canyon's reference to the "Special Master's reasoning and conclusions oflaw" presumably refers 
to the Special Master's holding that the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements. As described by Black 
Canyon, "Special Master Booth held, consistent with BCID's arguments, that the late claims should be disallowed 
on the additional basis that the water claimed by them was not subject to appropriation because it 'had already been 
appropriated through the existing storage rights' for the Reservoirs (i&.... the late claims were not necessary because 
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If, however, the Court finds that it should in this proceeding reach the question of 
whether the Storage Rights include a right to refill under priority, it should rule that no such right 
exists. As explained in Section IV.B below, the United States may refill its reservoirs with 
"excess water" so long as other rights are not injured (i.e., refill may occur, but not under 
priority).22 This is all the United States is entitled to under the Storage Rights and Idaho's Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine, and this is all that it needs. 
As Suez has urged throughout these proceedings, the Basin 63 proceedings, and the Basin 
Wide 17 proceedings, Idaho law must adhere to one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill principles 
when water is distributed to on-stream reservoir water rights such as the Storage Rights. Indeed, 
the SRBA Court agreed that the incorporation of these principles in the Department's accounting 
is consistent with Idaho law. Addendum to US Brief, Tab 2, p.7-14. Of course, the SRBA 
Court's affirmation of those principles is squarely at issue in the Basin 63 appeals, and those are 
the appropriate proceedings to address such issues. Suez will address those principles, and the 
Storage Rights' entitlements to divert excess water, fully in its briefing in the Basin 63 
proceedings but, given the arguments made by the Appellants in these Basin 65 appeals, feels 
compelled to address them here as well. 
A. The Storage Rights are entitled to one fill under priority based on the 
amount of storable inflow entering the reservoirs. 
The SRBA Court held in its Basin-Wide Issue 17 decision: 
Simply stated, under Idaho's doctrine of prior appropriation a 
senior storage holder may not fill or satisfy his water right multiple 
times, under priority, before rights held by affected junior 
the existing storage rights already authorized one physical fill of the reservoirs despite flood control releases in flood 
control years)." BCID Brief at 6. 
22 As discussed in Part IV.B below, "excess water" exists above and beyond all water rights, the diversion 
of which is lawful because (by definition) no other water right holder is entitled to that "excess water" at that time. 
Thus, diversion not under priority with "excess water" is in contrast to diversion under priority. 
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appropriators are satisfied once. 
R. at 886 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 10). Put another way, "[t]he assertion that a senior storage 
right holder can 'fill,' or 'satisfy,' his water right multiple times under priority before an affected 
junior water right is satisfied once is contrary to the prior appropriation doctrine as established 
under Idaho law." R. at 885 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 9). Suez refers to this principle as the 
"one-fill" rule. 
On appeal, this Court did not address whether the SRBA Court was correct in 
recognizing the one-fill rule, although it did state that the question it answered was "relatively 
straightforward." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 392,336 P.3d at 799. 
Indeed, it is straightforward. It is mandated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 
Under Idaho law, multiple fills of a water right, under right of priority, would be an enlargement 
of a water right, and this Court has held that enlargement constitutes per se injury. "An increase 
in the volume of water diverted is an enlargement .... " City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 
830,835,275 P.3d 845, 850 (2012) (Eismann, J.) (quoting Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. 
and Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454,458,926 P.2d 
1301, 1305 (1996) (Schroeder, J.)). "[T]here is per se injury to junior water rights holders 
anytime an enlargement receives priority. Priority in time is an essential part of western water 
law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right holder." Id. 
(citation omitted). See also Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 Idaho 414,420, 18 
P.3d 219,225 (2001) (Walters, J.) ("Enlargement includes increasing the amount of water 
diverted or consumed to accomplish the beneficial use."). 
To avoid enlarging the Storage Rights in violation of the one-fill rule, all legally and 
physically available water must be counted toward their satisfaction. Suez calls this the "storable 
inflow" principle. The storable inflow principle requires that if water is coming into a reservoir 
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and is "in priority" to the associated storage water right, it counts towards the fill of the storage 
right. The term "in priority" simply means that it is legally available to store, i.e., is not required 
to be bypassed for delivery to a downstream senior. 
In short, if water is physically and legally available to store, the storage right holder is 
expected to store it. If a storage right holder decides not to store storable inflow, or stores it and 
later releases some of it-for whatever reason-that does not reduce or otherwise affect the 
right's accrued fill. The right holder may not say, "Well, I think I'll just let this water pass and 
then take my single fill later." 
The storable inflow principle works in conjunction with the "paper fill" concept to give 
effect to the one-fill rule. Counting all "storable inflow" toward fill of a storage water right is 
frequently described as "paper fill"-a term perhaps coined by the Department when it 
implemented its computerized accounting systems, but that nonetheless is required by Idaho's 
Prior Appropriation Doctrine.23 
"Paper fill" captures two points: (1) all storable inflow counts toward filling the right, 
whether it is captured or not, and (2) releasing previously captured water does not reduce the 
accrued fill. Thus, once sufficient storable inflow (i.e., legally and physically available water) 
reaches the reservoir to satisfy the quantity element of the on-stream storage right, the right is 
considered satisfied and has been filled on paper (i.e., it has achieved paper fill). 
As will be discussed below, the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill rules properly 
enforce the Storage Rights' quantity and priority elements, assure junior water rights receive 
water at the times and in the amounts they are entitled to, promote the maximum use and least 
23 Throughout this brief, the term "paper fill" is not used as an accounting term, but rather as shorthand for 
the principle that one fill of a storage right has occurred under the storable inflow principle. Although the one fill, 
storable inflow, and paper fill principles are incorporated into the Department's accounting system, they are not 
merely accounting principles. Rather, they are mandated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 
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wasteful use of Idaho's water resources, and protect the State of Idaho's control over the 
distribution of its public waters. In contrast, the Appellants' suggestion that the Storage Rights 
include priority refill entitlements in wholly inconsistent with Idaho's Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine. 
(1) The essential elements of priority date and quantity must be 
given effect. 
Together, the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill principles operate to enforce what 
this Court has called "the essential elements of priority date and quantity"24 and to prevent 
impermissible enlargement of the Storage Rights' elements by limiting priority diversions to the 
decreed quantities (i.e., volumes) of the water rights. This Court has not had occasion to deal 
with the quantity issue in the context of storage refill. But it has been clear enough on the 
fundamental principle that quantity matters and that "vague and fluctuating" quantities do not fit 
under the Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 
This Court has imposed the measurement requirement as a 
corollary to the basic policy of the conservation of water resources 
for beneficial use. [Citing the Idaho Constitution and Water 
Code.] The Court has required such a measurement when the 
decree is intended to settle the rights of various appropriators who 
claim and use fluctuating amounts of water from the same source. 
Thus, if the decree awards an uncertain amount of water to one 
appropriator whose needs are vague and fluctuating, it is likely that 
he will waste water and yet have the power to prevent others from 
putting the surplus to any beneficial use. [Reference to cases 
rejecting decrees for unspecified amounts.] The practice 
condemned by these cases was not simply the issuance of 
unmeasured decrees but that of awarding to one competing 
appropriator more water than he could beneficially use. These 
cases express a policy against waste irrespective of the technical 
legal error found to have permitted it. 
24 State of Idaho v. Idaho Conservation League ("!CL If'), 131 Idaho 329, 333, 955 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1998) 
(Silak, J.). 
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Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 750-51, 450 P.2d 310, 313-14 (1969) (McQuade, J.) 
( emphasis added). 
That hits the nail on the head. If the federal government is allowed to store, release, and 
store again more water than it takes to reach the Storage Rights' authorized quantities, it will 
have stored more water than it can beneficially use, and it is "likely that that [it] will waste water 
and yet have the power to prevent others from putting the surplus to any beneficial use." Id. 
The United States correctly recognizes that the storable inflow and paper fill principles 
consider the Bureau as storing water towards the Storage Rights' satisfaction "even when 
Reclamation is physically lowering or simply maintaining reservoir levels." USA Brief at 40. As 
well it should! To do otherwise would be contrary to Idaho law by allowing the storage of more 
water than authorized under the Storage Rights' partial decrees. 
Take, for example, the Bureau's Cascade and Deadwood reservoirs, whose water rights 
total 863,000 acre-feet. Say the Bureau physically stored 600,000 acre-feet, and later vacated 
100,000 acre-feet of that stored water for flood control. If the Bureau was then allowed to 
physically refill the 100,000 acre-feet and also physically fill the remainder of the 863,000 acre-
feet of total reservoir space (i.e., the remaining 363,000 acre-feet), the total amount physically 
stored during this year would be 1,063,000 acre-feet (600,000 + 363,000 + 100,000 = 
1,063,000). In other words, by storing that 100,000 acre-foot block twice, the Bureau would 
exceed the total authorized volume of storage allowed under the Storage Rights. Thus, if the 
Bureau could physically store water under the Storage Rights' priority without counting it as 
water stored under the rights' priority, there would be no limit to how much water it could store 
under priority. 
The unlimited ability to satisfy a water right would be deeply problematical for Idaho's 
water law, particularly with respect to on-stream reservoirs. Unlike natural flow water rights and 
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off-stream storage rights, which are limited to diversions based on flow rates (cfs), the Storage 
Rights' quantity elements are described in terms of annual volume only, with no flow rate 
limitations. The lack of flow rate limitations in the Storage Rights' decrees is not an oversight or 
an ambiguity. The Storage Rights purposely-and prudently-were decreed with no flow limit 
so they could capture all of the Payette River's available flows while the rights were in priority. 
In other words, these on-stream rights authorize the federal government to control every drop of 
water in the river-but only when they are in priority during a single fill. This maximizes the 
potential the reservoirs will fill completely and do so at a time least in conflict with other water 
users. This makes more water available for juniors and maximizes the use of the State's water 
resources. 
Thus, when the Storage Rights are in priority, the federal government is entitled (and 
incentivized) to store all stream flow entering the reservoir that is not required to be delivered to 
senior water rights. Juniors are not entitled to call for water until the Storage Rights' decreed 
volumes have been satisfied (i.e., "paper fill" has been achieved). 
Contrary to Black Canyon's contentions,25 considering the Storage Rights satisfied based 
on their respective reservoirs' maximum physical fill would violate the Storage Rights' quantity 
elements. It is no limit at all to measure the satisfaction of an on-stream storage right (whose 
quantity is defined only as an annual volume limit) by the amount of water in the reservoir on the 
day of maximum physical fill. The decree might as well read, "Take and release all the water 
you want, whenever you want, and always take it priority until there is no more water to take." 
Such an unlimited right, exercised in priority, would enable the reservoir operator-in this case 
25 See, e.g., BCID Brief at 18 (arguing that the Storage Rights included the water "physically present in the 
Reservoirs at the point of maximum physical fill"). 
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the federal government-to control the entire river ( except for the rights senior to the Storage 
Rights). 
The Appellants also contend that flood releases do not count toward fill because flood 
releases are not beneficial uses.26 They are correct that beneficial use is a fundamental 
prerequisite in the creation and continued existence of any water right, but it has nothing to do 
with the accrual of water to an on-stream storage right. If a water right holder does not 
beneficially use the water distributed to it, that holder may suffer consequences. But it does not 
change the fact that the distribution of water has been made. 
The Storage Rights' decrees include no flood control exceptions to their quantity 
elements. Accordingly, if the storage right holders release stored or storable water-whether for 
beneficial uses or not-they must allow other water users to fill their rights before taking a 
second fill of the storage rights. This might sound harsh, but that is how the prior appropriation 
doctrine works when water is scarce.27 It does not allow "do-overs" when a user wastes the 
water to which they are legally entitled. The storable inflow and paper fill principles represent 
strict enforcement of the quantity and priority date elements, not the reservoir owner-friendly 
"discretion" advocated by the Appellants. 
The United States' and Black Canyon's beneficial use arguments do not address the fact 
that water stored, but later spilled for flood control, must count toward the satisfaction of a 
storage right. The reason is simple. The Department's distribution of water to various water 
rights has nothing to do with beneficial use. Applying water to beneficial use (or otherwise 
26 See, e.g., US Brief at 41 ("waters stored and released solely for flood-control purposes are not 
appropriations"); BCID Brief at 14 (stating that flood control releases are not beneficial uses of water, and that such 
releases frustrate the purpose of a storage water right). 
27 "These principles [ of the prior appropriation doctrine] become even more difficult, and harsh, in their 
application in times of drought." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 
(2007) (Trout, J.). 
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releasing it, such as for flood control) is the business and concern of the storage right holder. It 
is not a factor in distribution or in determining fill of a storage water right. Once water is 
distributed to a right holder, that person may release it to irrigate crops (a beneficial use), to 
irrigate rocks (a waste of water that could lead to forfeiture), or to vacate space to capture 
predicted flood waters (a potentially reasonable and lawful but nevertheless non-beneficial use 
under the decreed storage rights28). None of these actions-which occur at some point after the 
distribution of water-has any bearing on the quantity of water that person is entitled to receive 
under priority. The water right holder is not entitled to a second helping at the expense of juniors 
if they fail to apply their first helping to an authorized beneficial use-no matter what the reason. 
(2) Junior water rights are entitled to protection. 
Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine protects not only the senior's right against 
interference by juniors. It also protects the junior's right to be shielded from wrongful or 
wasteful acts that effectively enlarge the rights of seniors. "Priority in time is an essential part of 
western water law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right 
holder." Jenkins v. State, Dept. o/Water Res., 103 Idaho 384,388,647 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1982). 
"[T]here is per se injury to junior water rights holders anytime an enlargement receives priority. 
Priority in time is an essential part of western water law and to diminish one's priority works an 
undeniable injury to that water right holder." Id. ( citation omitted). See also Van Camp v. 
Emery, 13 Idaho 202,208, 89 P. 752, 754 (1907) (holding that a senior may divert the quantity 
of water to which he is entitled to in priority but after filling the right once, may not "hinder or 
impede the flow of the remaining stream" to the junior); City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 835, 275 
P.3d at 850 ("An increase in the volume of water diverted is an enlargement .... "). Any 
28 If reasonably compelled by the need to prevent flooding, such releases presumably would be protected 
from forfeiture under Idaho Code§ 42-223(6), but this question is not before the Court. 
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contention that the Storage Rights may be filled multiple times under right of priority cannot be 
reconciled with these foundational principles of water law. As the SRBA Court held: "[U]nder 
the prior appropriation doctrine as established under Idaho law, a senior storage right holder may 
not refill his storage water right under priority before junior appropriators satisfy their water 
rights once." R. at 889 (SRBA BWI 17 Decision at 13). 
(3) Idaho law and policy requires the maximum use of the State's 
water resources. 
The storable inflow and paper fill principles also are necessary to ensure "the maximum 
use and benefit, and least wasteful use ofldaho's water resources." Idaho Ground Water Assoc. 
v. IDWR ("Rangen IF'), 160 Idaho 119, 129,369 P.3d 897, 907 (2016) (J. Jones, C.J.); Kunz v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 904, 792 P .2d 926, 929 ( 1990) (Bakes, J. ). These 
principles require on-stream storage right holders to store all water that is legally and physically 
available until their decreed volumes are met, or else suffer the consequences if they choose 
otherwise. If they are not held to this standard, water that could and should have been stored will 
flow downstream in quantities and at times when other users do not expect it and cannot use it, 
and then reservoirs will be filled later with water that other users are expecting. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that a senior may not take his water inefficiently so as to 
deprive others: 
In this arid country, where the largest duty and the greatest 
use must be had from every inch of water in the interest of 
agriculture and home building, it will not do to say that a stream 
may be dammed so as to cause subirrigation of a few acres at a loss 
of enough water to surface irrigate 10 times as much by proper 
application. 
Van Camp v. Emery, 13 Idaho 202,202, 89 P. 752, 752 (1907) (Ailshie, C.J.). 
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schodde v. Twin Falls Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 
(1912), held that that there is "no right under the constitution and laws of the State ofldaho to 
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appropriate the current of the river so as to render it impossible for others to apply the otherwise 
unappropriated waters of the river to beneficial uses." Schodde, 224 U.S. at 117 (1912). The 
Schodde Court cited one of its earlier cases in concluding that a water right "must be exercised 
with reference to the general condition of the country and the necessities of the people, and not 
so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or community of its use and vest an absolute monopoly in 
a single individual." Schodde, 224 U.S. at 121 (quoting Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 683, 
87 U.S. 670,683 (1874)). 
In the same year as Schodde, this Court held that extending priority to "all the waters that 
flow" during the high runoff period is contrary to the constitutional principle that right to 
appropriate unappropriated flows may never be denied: 
To say that the respondents are entitled to all the waters that flow 
in the stream, when there is more water flowing at some seasons of 
the year than respondents are able to divert and apply to a 
beneficial use, would deny the right of appropriation by any other 
person, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents were not 
diverting or applying the excess to a beneficial use. 
Lee v. Hanford, 21 Idaho 327, 331, 121 P. 558, 560 (1912) (Stewart, C.J.). 
Citing nearly a century of precedent, this Court observed in 1990: "The policy of the law 
of this State is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water 
resources." Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 904, 792 P.2d 926, 929 (1990) 
(Bakes, J.). 
In 2011, this Court reiterated the State's longstanding commitment to this principle: 
In Niday v. Barker, 16 Idaho 73, 79, 101 P. 254, 256 
( 1909), we stated, "The theory of the law is that the public waters 
of this state shall be subjected to the highest and greatest duty." In 
Farmers' Co-operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irrigation District, 
Ltd., 16 Idaho 525,535, 102 P. 481,483 (1909), we phrased it, 
"Economy must be required and demanded in the use and 
application of water." In Poole v. 0/aveson, 82 Idaho 496, 502, 
356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960), we expressed the same concept by stating, 
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"The policy of the law of this State is to secure the maximum use 
and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water resources." 
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,808,252 P.3d 71, 89 (2011) (Eismann, 
C.J.). 
And, just last year, this Court again reinforced this principle: "As we recently stated in 
Clear Springs, the policy of securing the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use of 
Idaho's water resources, has long been the policy in Idaho." Rangen 11, 160 Idaho at 129,369 
P .3d at 907. This Court also explained that Schodde is not just about a reasonable means of 
diversion. It established a general principle of maximum beneficial use: 
[T]he principles stated in Schodde apply equally in this water 
management case where the senior appropriator seeks to assert 
control over practically the entire aquifer, regardless of the 
minimal benefit to the senior and the great detriment to the juniors. 
Rangen II, 160 Idaho at 133, 369 P.3d at 911. 
This maximum use principle is of great import here. By their very nature, on-stream 
reservoirs control the entire river. That control is reflected on the face of the associated storage 
right in that, unlike other rights, they are decreed with no instantaneous flow limit. The only 
quantity limit is their annual volume. Thus, they may take every drop of water when they are in 
priority. This unique quantity limitation gives storage rights both the ability and the obligation to 
capture all legally available water when they can, as early in the accounting year as possible. 
This Court has recognized that storage rights are different than natural flow rights. 
There is a fundamental difference with regard to the 
diversion and use of water from a flowing stream and a reservoir. 
In a stream if a user does not take out his water, it may be diverted 
by the other appropriators, because otherwise it flows on and is 
dissipated. But the very purpose of storage is to retain and hold for 
subsequent use, direct or augmentary, hence retention is not of 
itself illegal nor does it deprive the user of the right to continue to 
hold. 
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Rayl v. Salmon River Canal Co., 66 Idaho 199,208, 157 P.2d 76, 80 (1945) (Givens, J.). The 
SRBA Court also has recognized this difference: "An on-stream reservoir alters the stream 
affecting the administration of all rights on the source." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 388, 336 P .3d at 
795 (quoting SRBA Court). 
These fundamental attributes of storage rights require the conclusion that an on-stream 
reservoir operator may not fill its reservoir at the operator's convenience. Idaho's Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine expects the holders of the Storage Rights (which authorize storage for 
beneficial uses and do not include flood control) to store as much water was possible when it is 
available. Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 91, 558 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1977) ("the entire 
water distribution system under Title 42 of the Idaho Code is to further the State's policy of 
securing the maximum use and benefit of its water resources."). To the extent possible, this 
should happen before or early in the irrigation season when plenty of water is available. When 
storable inflow is released or bypassed during these periods, it rarely provides benefit to 
downstream holders of water rights (most of whom desire diversions during the irrigation 
season), and the water flows irretrievably out-of-state. 
(4) The State of Idaho must retain control over the distribution of 
water. 
The United States contends that the Bureau must have "discretion to determine how and 
when to impound flows in satisfaction of its storage rights .... " US Brief at 41. It already has 
that discretion when its rights are in priority or when there is "excess water" in the river. 
However, the degree of discretion sought by the United States-to take a second fill to the 
detriment of other users-would take away the Director's authority under Idaho Code 42-602 to 
administer the State's public waters in the Payette River according to the Storage Rights' stated 
quantities. The proposal would impermissibly allow the federal government to take any quantity 
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it chooses, thereby vitiating the quantity element of their decreed rights, blocking future 
appropriations, and effectively abdicating State control to the federal reservoir operators. 
Because high flows simply are unappropriated waters, the approach urged by the 
Appellants would effectively give the federal government a priority entitlement to all of the 
unappropriated waters in the streams harnessed by Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs. But the 
federal government has no right to prevent future appropriations. Idaho Const. art. 15, § 3 ("The 
right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, 
shall never be denied"); Parker v. Wallentine, l 03 Idaho 506, 513, 650 P.2d 648, 655 (1982) 
("The right to appropriate unappropriated water is guaranteed by article XV, section 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution"). 
The Appellants improperly conflate reservoir operations and water rights.29 The United 
States has and will continue to have control over its reservoir operations. Like any dam operator, 
it has the authority (and the duty) to bypass or release water to in the interest of downstream 
flood control.30 But that has no bearing on when its water rights are filled or how the State 
distributes water. 
29 The United States says that "Reclamation treated flood control to be independent of the water rights 
system and prior appropriation." US Brief at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps so. But the 
Reclamation Act of 1902-the law under which Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs were constructed, US Brief at 
10-requires that the federal government defer to Idaho's laws "relating to the control, appropriation, use, [ and] 
distribution of water .... " 43 U.S.C. § 383 (Sec. 8 of Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388). Again, whether the Late 
Claims could be proven up, or whether the Storage Rights include priority refill entitlements, is a question ofldaho 
water law. Thus, the federal government may operate its reservoirs however it pleases but, as required by the 
Reclamation Act, the storage of water for beneficial use (i.e., the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of 
water) is dictated by Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 
30 Idaho's common law of torts imposes obligations on dam owners, and the federal government may pose 
further and more stringent duties on its own facilities, but these are not obligations imposed by the prior 
appropriation doctrine or the Storage Rights' decrees. The Bureau's release of water stored for beneficial use is 
found in the federal policies that provide for the Payette River reservoirs to be operated in part for flood control, and 
also in Idaho's common law that requires all reservoir owners to operate reasonably. Burgess v. Salmon River 
Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299,305, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1991) ("we conclude that there is a similar duty of 
reasonableness upon the operator of a dam who, once having impeded the flow of a natural stream by impounding it 
in a reservoir, thereby exercising control of the flow of the water in the stream, subsequently discharges water from 
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The key distinction that must be made is that the one-fill, storable inflow, and paper fill 
principles-and the quantity element of a storage water right-have nothing to do with whether 
reservoirs are actually physically full. These principles-and Idaho's Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine in general-are concerned with water rights, not reservoir operations (which are not 
dictated by Idaho law and, in this case, are at the federal government's discretion). 
The federal government's reservoir operations do not define the scope or administration 
of the Storage Rights or Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine. The Storage Rights, in fact, 
authorize only storage and beneficial uses from storage. Neither they nor Idaho's water law 
authorizes flood control or any other reservoir operations inconsistent with those decreed 
purposes. 
Physical fill is simply a function of reservoir operations-operations that are controlled 
by the federal government in the case of the Boise River reservoirs. It is not a water right 
concept, and it has nothing to do with accounting for the fill of the Storage Rights. Likewise, 
paper fill based on storable inflow has nothing to do with whether a reservoir is actually 
physically filled. It is a principle necessary for the proper administration of on-stream storage 
water rights under Idaho law. 
The corollary to this is that achieving paper fill means that sufficient storable inflow has 
reached the reservoirs to satisfy the water right and completely fill the reservoirs. Thus, if 
complete paper fill is achieved, any failure to physically fill the reservoirs results from the 
federal reservoir operators' operational decisions, such as deciding to bypass or release water for 
flood control (or for some other federal objective). No one but the federal government controls 
the timing or quantity of flood control releases ( or any other operational decisions for that 
the reservoir into the natural stream bed.") See also Kunz v. Utah Power& Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(holding that an on-stream reservoir owner may assume a duty of flood control). 
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matter) from the federal on-stream reservoirs. These operational decisions do not affect accrual 
of water to the Storage Rights under Idaho law. Accordingly, the United States and its 
contractors-not other water users-should bear any adverse consequences resulting from the 
federal government's operational decisions. 
B. The Bureau's existing Storage Rights inherently authorize the capture 
of excess water so long as other rights are not injured. 
The Appellants raise the alarm that if they are not allowed to refill in priority, the federal 
reservoirs may not fill. This is a false alarm. In accordance with the one-fill, storable inflow, 
and paper fill principles described above, the federal reservoirs fill just fine in wet years (when 
there are flood releases) because Idaho law allows them to capture "excess water." 
"Excess water" is sometimes called "high flows" occurring under "free river" conditions. 
Excess flows, high flows, and free river all mean the same thing: that there is more than enough 
water in the system to satisfy all water rights. In other words, at that moment the system 
contains some unappropriated water. As this Court has recognized, "excess water inherently 
relates to water that has not been decreed." A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League 
("!CL r'), 131 Idaho 411, 416, 958 P.2d 568, 573 (1997) (McDevitt, J.). 
This Court has approved the practice of allowing "those who otherwise have water rights 
... to use excess water when it is available." State of Idaho v. Idaho Conservation League 
("!CL IF'), 131 Idaho 329, 333, 955 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1998) (Silak, J.). Thus, the capture of high 
flows when that can be done without injury to others can be recognized as an inherent, or 
ancillary, part of every on-stream storage right. 31 Accordingly, excess water stored after paper 
fill is water lawfully stored under the Storage Rights. 
31 !CL I and !CL II dealt with general provisions contained in prior decrees, but this does not alter the 
conclusion that Idaho's Prior Appropriation Doctrine allows free river water to be captured ancillary to an existing 
right. These decisions support the conclusion that the use of excess water by existing water right holders is allowed 
under Idaho law whether or not the practice is decreed in a general provision. 
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To be clear, the Storage Rights' ancillary entitlement to take a second fill with excess 
water is not a distinct water right that can be exercised under priority. "[T]here cannot be a prior 
relation to excess water." !CL I, 131 Idaho at 416,958 P.2d at 573. In other words, Idaho law 
recognizes that excess water may be stored and used when it is available by "those who 
otherwise have water rights," !CL II, 131 Idaho at 333, 955 P.2d at 1112, but such capture of 
excess water may not impair existing rights or prevent future appropriations of that water. In 
other words, the right to take excess water is subordinated to all existing and future water rights. 
In short, the ancillary right to store and use excess waters can be viewed as a part and parcel of 
decreed on-stream storage rights, including the United States' Storage Rights in Basin 65 (and 
elsewhere). 
Indeed, in the context of storage rights, allowing the storage of high flows is compelled 
by the principle of maximum beneficial use. That is, if water is available for storage without 
injury to others--even after paper fill-the constitutional principle of maximum use compels the 
right to its capture and storage because, otherwise, that water would flow down the river unused. 
Obviously, the right to refill with excess water is different than the right to store under 
priority. Excess water is simply unappropriated water that, like all of Idaho's unappropriated 
water, is subject to appropriation. Idaho Const. art. XV § 3 ("The right to divert and appropriate 
the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied .... "). 
Nevertheless, it is an entitlement that any storage right holder should embrace. Why would any 
water user disavow an entitlement that could only benefit them by increasing the amount of 
water they could lawfully divert? 
Although excess water is not stored under priority, once stored, the right holder has a 
legally protected right to its use. See Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep 't of Water 
Res., 143 Idaho 862, 879, 154 P.3d 433,450 (2007) (quoting Washington County Irrigation Dist. 
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v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382,385, 43 P.2d 943, 945 (1935)) ("when water is stored, it becomes 'the 
property of the appropriators ... impressed with the public trust to apply it to a beneficial use.'") 
Thus, the federal government owns and controls its lawfully stored excess water-just as it does 
water stored under priority. Once captured, no other right holder may call for its release. The 
reservoir operator may release the water for beneficial use by the spaceholders, carry it over for 
future use, or release it for flood control. 
Excess water and unappropriated water are the same thing; but the terms address different 
things that might happen to that water. When a storage right holder takes excess water, it does 
not become appropriated because he already was allowed to take it as excess water under his 
existing water right. In contrast, as soon as someone else appropriates today's free river water, it 
will not be excess anymore. 32 
There is no dispute that flood control provides benefits to flood-threatened landowners 
and communities (some who may not be water right holders). Likewise, there can be no dispute 
that flood control is not an authorized purpose of use of the Storage Rights. Flood control 
obligations exist, but they are not part of and they do not dictate Idaho's Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine, which is concerned with diversion and beneficial use of water, not flood control. Dam 
operators must ( and do) balance their flood control obligations and their duty to store water for 
beneficial use. Given that flood control happens in times of high water, the federal reservoirs are 
virtually always refilled without injury to others by capture of excess water ancillary to the 
32 This Court must reject any argument that the only excess water that is available for appropriation is water 
released from Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs for flood control purposes. If that is the case, then the availability 
of unappropriated water is fully dependent on the federal government's reservoir operational decisions (as they 
evolve over time). If all future appropriations are thus subordinated, the federal government has effectively 
appropriated every last drop of those streams. It also means that there is no such thing as unappropriated water 
upstream from each reservoir's outlet-which, of course, is where the vast majority of excess waters originate. 
Neither of these outcomes is consistent with Idaho law or interests. Idaho Const. art. XV§ 3 ("The right to divert 
and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied .... ") 
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Storage Rights. The clock is not broken. Replacing it with priority refill is an unnecessary and 
dangerous proposition. 
V. SUEZ IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
In addition to costs, Suez seeks attorney fees on these appeals under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117(1). To the extent Suez prevails on only a portion of the issues it has presented on 
appeal and cross-appeal, it seeks attorney fees for the portion of the case on which it prevailed 
under Idaho Code§ 12-117(2). Suez is entitled to attorney fees because the positions taken by 
the Appellants are without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The Late Claims are water right claims based on the alleged pre-1971 diversion and 
beneficial use of water. However, neither Black Canyon nor the United States concern 
themselves with proving beneficial use for those claims. Instead, they ask that the Late Claims 
be deemed unnecessary. If they are unnecessary, they should have withdrawn them. What they 
really seek-redefinition of the Storage Rights and/or changes in the Department's 
administration of those rights-is beyond the scope of these Late Claim proceedings. They 
could have sought to re-open the Storage Rights in the SRBA under I.R.C.P. 60. Or they could 
have asked the Department to initiate proceedings to examine its accounting methodology. But 
instead they pursued their unfounded arguments on appeal here. 
The District Court carefully and thoroughly explained this to the Appellants in its 
decision. That explanation should have been heeded. Instead, they have continued to pursue the 
Late Claims on appeal, advocating for priority refill entitlements in the Storage Rights, which are 
not before this Court. Their arguments are procedurally barred. They are also wrong on the 
merits. 
Accordingly, Suez is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal because these strategies are 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Suez asks that his Court affirm the SRBA Court's ruling in these appeals. 
Respectfully submitted on June 9, 2017. 
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